TEHRAN – Hezbollah’s supporters in Lebanon have been subjected to continuous psychological, media, and cognitive warfare alongside the fierce Israeli aggression against the country.

A central aspect of this cognitive war focuses on creating the impression that consensus around Hezbollah, particularly within its Shia base, has weakened, that the Lebanese resistance has become a burden, and the costs borne by society now outweigh any benefits.

One indication of this was the considerable attention that regional and domestic media outlets hostile to Hezbollah paid to two declarations: one named after the city of Tyre, the other after Nabatieh. Both called for the two cities to remain open and free of weapons. Many observers viewed the content of the declarations as surrendering to the Israeli Occupation Forces (IOF) without resistance, thereby allowing it to occupy the cities and their surrounding areas.

Anti-Hezbollah media celebrated the declarations and portrayed them as far more significant than they actually were. The signatories were glorified and showered with descriptions of courage and heroism. At the same time, no attention was paid to the fact that several signatories later stated that the text sent to them for signature differed from the version that was ultimately published. Through social media, they stated that they had been deceived and misled and demanded that their names be removed.

The exaggeration surrounding the significance of the two declarations reached the point where the newspaper Asharq Al-Awsat described them as evidence of what it called a “rebellion” within the Shia community.

Any observer familiar with Shia affairs in Lebanon knows that the signatories represent a segment of society for which there is no evidence of growing support. In fact, the current aggression has witnessed the opposite trend: Shia and Sunni intellectuals as well as public figures who had opposed Hezbollah’s domestic policies over the past two decades have declared clear and notable support for the movement in its resistance operations against the IOF. 

The declarations' content and concepts largely align with narratives promoted in anti-resistance media and political discourse, centered on several key themes.

First: creating a rift within the resistance community.

This objective has been pursued by the Zionist regime for many years. The massacres it has committed, coupled with the widespread urban destruction of villages across southern Lebanon plus threats to replicate Gaza’s genocide, represent a new attempt to achieve what it couldn’t since 1982.

Anti-Hezbollah media operate in harmony with the occupying regime. They focus almost exclusively on the human and material costs of the aggression, seeking to cement the idea that the interests of society are incompatible with the option of resistance.

Second: Creating a sense of futility.

Opponents of Hezbollah promote the narrative that the option of resistance has lost its purpose, blaming it for the decline or loss of past achievements. The occupying regime isolates current events from their historical and political causes, creating a framework that justifies its war crimes while weakening the public’s ability to understand the causes and background of the conflict.

As a result, concepts of steadfastness and its importance in asymmetric warfare gradually disappear from media discourse, replaced by narratives claiming that sacrifices were made in vain, that no path forward exists, and that continuing the confrontation offers no meaningful gains.

Third: redefining victory and defeat.

Those opposed to Hezbollah ignore a core military principle: victory and defeat are not measured by the number of casualties or the scale of destruction suffered, but by each side’s ability to achieve political and strategic goals.

The standards for victory and defeat in asymmetric warfare also differ fundamentally from those used in conventional wars between regular armies. The conventional army loses if it does not win. Guerrilla warfare wins if it does not lose.

In this type of conflict, resistance movements need only avoid defeat. If the opposing side, possessing overwhelming firepower and technological superiority, fails to break their will, eliminate their ability to continue, or undermine the resilience of their supporting community, it has not achieved its aims.

Yet anti-Hezbollah media disregards these realities and seeks to redefine victory and defeat according to standards that treat human and material losses as automatic evidence of defeat, regardless of political and strategic outcomes. This approach has been intensively promoted in Lebanon during the current aggression, both politically and in the media.

Fourth: A sense of helplessness is among the most dangerous concepts cultivated through cognitive warfare.

Narratives are crafted to push people into believing the Lebanese resistance front cannot end the new occupation, that the balance of power has definitively settled in the occupying regime’s favor, making any confrontation or change futile. Notably, this discourse is not new; it prevailed during the 1980s and 1990s before losing much credibility after Hezbollah’s liberation of southern Lebanon in 2000. Yet the media machine never stops reproducing it in various forms, trying to entrench feelings of helplessness and frustration among the public.

Fifth: Dismantling collective memory.

Anti-Hezbollah media frequently revisit historical moments during which the resistance movement proved effective and achieved decisive successes, particularly in 2000 and 2006. However, these references are not intended to examine those events within their genuine context but rather to reinterpret them in ways that alter their established meaning in the collective consciousness.

Regarding the 2000 liberation, narratives are promoted claiming the IOF withdrew because of internal considerations or international and regional circumstances, and that the resistance was not the decisive factor behind the withdrawal. As for the July 2006 War, the narrative focusing on the high human and material costs continues to be repeated while overlooking the fact that the Zionist regime itself acknowledged its failures and, through numerous reports and commissions, recognized the strategic consequences produced by the war.

Sixth: Targeting the moral meaning of resistance.

All of the previous efforts ultimately converge on a central objective: undermining the resistance movement’s image as an experience rooted in values like dignity, freedom, independence, sacrifice, and steadfastness. For Hezbollah supporters, resistance represents a cultural and ethical model that many see as capable of reviving the nation, changing its destiny, and defending its independence.

This is why opponents place such importance on targeting its moral dimension, which stands in direct conflict with the political, economic, and cultural projects of domination that Western powers have sought to entrench in the region since the end of the Second World War.

This objective is among the most fundamental goals of the resistance movement’s adversaries. They continuously seek factors that can help achieve it from within Hezbollah’s own social environment, knowing that once the moral meaning of resistance is shaken, its other sources of strength become more fragile and vulnerable.

Nevertheless, supporters of Hezbollah have so far shown a remarkable ability to confront psychological and cognitive warfare, proving they possess significant immunity against many messages targeting their collective consciousness.

The continued trust between Hezbollah and its social base has been a key reason these attempts failed to succeed, especially on the domestic front. Here, the two declarations bearing the names Tyre and Nabatieh failed to achieve the impact their promoters sought, as their effect remained limited and did not actually exceed the circle of signatories.